


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26 October 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
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CONTENTS

1. Berlin: Soviet commandant insists on right of East Germans to exercise control at sector border. (*Page i*) 25X1




3. Iran: Shah considering removing Amini and resuming personal control of government. (*Page ii*)
4. Egypt: Nasir's distrust of his army officers. (*Page ii*)
5. South Korea - Japan: Visit to Tokyo of key South Korean leader unlikely to contribute to settlement of differences between the two countries. (*Page iii*)




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7. Watch Committee Conclusions. (*Page iv*)

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AUTHORIZED BORDER CROSSING POINTS

MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS
AND OCCUPATION FORCES ONLY

- 8. Friedrichstrasse
- WEST GERMANS ONLY
- 3. Barnhalmerstrasse
- 9. Heinrich Heine Strasse
- WEST BERLINERS ONLY
- 5. Chausseestrasse
- 6. Invalidenstrasse
- 10. Oberbaumbruecke
- 13. Sannen Allee

ORIGINAL CROSSING POINTS
OF 13 AUGUST NOW CLOSED

- 1. Kapenhagenerstrasse
- 2. Wallankstrasse
- 4. Brunnenstrasse
- 7. Brandenburger Tor (Gate)
- 11. Puschkin Allee
- 12. Eisenstrasse
- 14. Rudawerstrasse

Authorized East Germans and East Berliners presumably can cross at any Border Points still open.



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DAILY BRIEF

*Berlin: The Soviet Union has now given its support to the East German regime's systematic efforts of the last several days to force US officials to acknowledge the right of East German guards at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in East Berlin to exercise control over US-licensed vehicles driven by civilians, or accept a self-imposed denial of entry to the Soviet sector. In response to a protest personally made by the American commander in Berlin on 25 October against these East German practices, the Soviet commandant, Solovyev, insisted on the right of the East Germans to exercise controls at the East-West Berlin sector border. Solovyev further maintained that the USSR can not influence or interfere with East German actions at the sector border.

US officials maintain that US forces license plates are sufficient identification, while the East Germans have insisted that the occupants must, when not in uniform, show identification documents. Soviet officials in Berlin had indicated their acceptance of the US position as recently as 22 October when the Soviet political advisor told the American political advisor that the East Germans had made a mistake in not permitting the passage of US-licensed vehicles and that this would be corrected. This statement was followed on the next day, however, with an East German Interior Ministry announcement that the regime's police were under instructions to permit foreign citizens to pass only after showing their passports. The announcement claimed that "persons in civilian clothes" were trying to evade these regulations without "proving" membership in the Western occupation forces.

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Iran: The Shah, who has reluctantly supported Prime Minister Amini for six months, may be considering resuming personal control of the government as complaints increase from special interests affected by Amini's reform program. The Shah has probably been dissatisfied by his lack of complete control over Amini, who was appointed in May following public demonstrations directed against last February's rigged elections. A number of politicians, landowners, and government officials who have the Shah's ear are reportedly urging early elections, which would be so arranged as to result in the removal of the Amini government.

No

The Shah's leadership has not been effective in the past, and his return to running the government would invite widespread criticism and encourage more plotting against him.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea - Japan: Korean security chief Col. Kim Chong-pil, a key figure in the junta, is in Tokyo [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] to expedite the negotiations under way since 20 October for the settlement of outstanding differences between Japan and South Korea. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has indicated that Prime Minister Ikeda is not prepared to discuss figures for a financial settlement of South Korean claims, which is the issue of paramount interest to the Koreans. Tokyo will, however, try to prevent Kim from appearing to have failed as did a previous Korean mission.

[redacted] Kim may also intend to explore the possibility of negotiating a mutual defense pact with Japan and Nationalist China. Kim was in Taiwan earlier this month. He is almost certain to be turned down on this proposal because of Japanese fears of becoming involved in any military arrangement. Public knowledge of such a proposal would provide the Japanese opposition with an issue for attacking the government and further jeopardize the prospects of normalizing relations between the two countries.

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DAILY BRIEF

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.]

No

South Vietnam: [Communist forces continue to increase their efforts to undermine the Diem government by sabotage and terrorism and to expand the Viet Cong areas of military control in South Vietnam.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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The Secretary of the Navy

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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